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Abstract— Out-group members are commonly viewed as 
being less human than in-group members. They are denied 
certain human characteristics and in turn become associated with 
machines or automata. Specifically, out-groups are attributed 
less naturally and uniquely human traits, and they are also seen 
as being less able to experience complex emotions in comparison 
to the in-group. Such dissociations have been demonstrated with 
real human faces but in our study, we aimed to test whether 
similar effects generalize to their artificial versions. Caucasian 
participants were presented with images of male Caucasian and 
Indian faces. Their task was to evaluate to what extent naturally 
and uniquely human traits, as well as primary and secondary 
emotions, can be attributed to them. In line with previous 
research, it was found that positive naturally human traits were 
attributed to a greater degree to the in-group than to the out-
group, applying to both real and artificial faces. Moreover, 
negative naturally human traits and negative primary emotions 
were attributed more to the out-group. This indicates a positive 
bias towards the in-group and subtle out-group derogation. The 
results extend prior research based on real human faces and 
show that intergroup processes emerge similarly in response to 
artificial faces, which may have implications for the fields of 
computer graphics and animation. That is, even the most realistic 
face recognized as belonging to an out-group member may 
convey less humanness than that of an in-group member. 
Keywords— objectification; dehumanization; realism; emotion; 
out-group 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
People’s reactions to computers are inherently social [1]. 
Hence it is logical to assume that one way of aiding human-
computer interactions (HCI) is to increase humanness of the 
interfaces, which should render them more natural and 
understandable [2]. This may be achieved, for instance, by 
incorporating an agent with a human face [3]. First attempts to 
synthesize a highly authentic face began over 40 years ago [4]. 
To this day, creation of flawless photorealistic faces remains 
the “ultimate challenge” of computer graphics and animation 
[5, 6, 7], primarily oriented towards contributions to the areas 
of entertainment and virtual reality [8]. On the other hand, 
Mori [9, 10] warned against the efforts to attain a very human-
like appearance in design. He predicted that when characters 
approach extreme levels of human likeness, they might 
suddenly lose credibility and evoke feelings of uneasiness, a 
phenomenon referred to as the Uncanny Valley [9].  
Faces are regarded as an exceptionally important [11], or 
even special [12, 13], type of a stimulus, which engages brain 
areas thought to be specialized in its processing [14]. Lately, a 
lot of research has been devoted to how synthetic faces are 
perceived, but the results have been rather mixed. Some 
studies, for example those relying on functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and event-related brain potentials 
(ERP), found that artificial faces seem to be processed 
differently than real faces [15, 16]. A similar conclusion was 
reached in a few studies exploring the recognition of emotions 
[17, 18]. However, findings to the contrary abound, suggesting 
that various kinds of artificial faces, as well as face-like 
objects, elicit responses and allow emotion detection rates 
close to those of real faces [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. 
Furthermore, although faces attract attention faster than other 
items [25] and as visual cues are favored over other types of 
input [26], this is also true for schematic face-like stimuli [27]. 
Finally, computer-generated faces are often used in research 
on group categorization and prejudice the results of which 
map onto those employing real faces [28, 29, 30]. 
Consequently, their usage is considered to be advantageous 
because their external features or expressions can be easily 
manipulated and controlled, unlike in the case of real faces. 
Nonetheless, one apparent drawback of all of these studies is 
that the artificial faces represented the African-American 
minority associated with very specific stereotypes, for instance 
being aggressive [31]. 
Independently of questions concerning how the realism of 
facial stimuli influences purely perceptual processes, faces are 
an extraordinarily functional social stimulus. They carry a 
multitude of information and meaning, and serve as a cue for 
instant evaluations of others on distinct attributes. The 
essentials include gender, age, and ethnicity [32], and many 
other characteristics as well, such as attractiveness, likeability, 
and trustworthiness [33], or competence [34]. Moreover, faces 
are typically the first source of information pertaining to group 
membership. Categorization of people as belonging to either 
one’s in-group or out-group is common and in fact 
unavoidable in real-life social encounters [35]. In general, the 
in-group is the foundation for positive identity and so it is 
favored over out-groups [36, 37, 38]. Out-group members are 
frequently targets of prejudice [39, 40].  
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One of the manifestations of out-group prejudice, and its 
worst case, is the failure to perceive out-group members as 
complete human beings [41]. Thereby, they are not granted a 
full range of human qualities, comprising personality traits 
[42], complex emotions that are a marker of sophistication 
[43], and mental states [44]. Denial of traits that have been 
previously identified as natural or essential to all human 
beings (naturally human traits, e.g., warmth, depth) reduces 
people to objects, machines or automata [45]. This 
phenomenon has been thus termed mechanistic 
dehumanization and was theorized to have implications 
particularly in the domain of computer technology [45]. In a 
different line of research, equation of humans with objects is 
referred to as objectification [46]. It is associated with 
perceived lack of mind and what follows, compromised 
capacities that are distinctive for humans [47], especially the 
ability to experience refined emotions (secondary emotions, 
e.g., elevation, envy, but not basic, or primary, emotions, e.g., 
happiness, anger; [43]). 
 
Differential attribution of human characteristics to in-
groups and out-groups has been demonstrated by numerous 
studies in which social groups were represented descriptively 
[42, 48, 49, 50]. Only a few studies so far relied on visual, and 
here specifically facial, stimuli [51, 52, 53]. These were 
always the faces of living humans and it has been found that 
faces of out-group members appear overall less human. This 
intergroup phenomenon has not been investigated yet in the 
context of artificial faces. Avatar-like faces have been used 
before to show intergroup prejudice, mainly towards African-
Americans, as well as decreased empathic responding to this 
racial group [54]. Nevertheless, group membership of the 
computer-generated characters has not been considered to play 
a role in how human-like they seem to the viewers. In our 
paper, we argue that group categorization is an important 
psychological factor engaged in reactions to synthetic 
characters. Therefore, just as real faces in daily interactions, 
even highly human-like synthetic faces may be perceived as 
representing diminished humanness when they convey group 
membership other than one’s own. 
Based on previous work outlined above, two main 
hypotheses were developed. First, we predicted that out-group 
faces would have human qualities attributed to them to a lesser 
degree. Second, this out-group effect would be similar for real 
and artificial faces. In an attempt to go beyond the widely 
studied racial categories (i.e., Afro-Americans) into the area of 
unknown out-groups or groups that elicit ambiguous attitudes, 
we presented members of a homogenously Caucasian society 
(Polish) with real and artificial faces of Indians. This was 
thought to be an out-group with which Polish participants 
were likely not to have had much direct interaction and which 
clearly differed in regard to looks, but was not paired with 
uniformly negative stereotypes. The study was conducted on-
line. Realism was treated as a between-subjects factor, 
ensuring that artificial faces were not instantly assumed to 
represent their real counterparts. Participants’ task was to 
evaluate the degree to which naturally and uniquely human 
traits as well as uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions 
could be attributed to the faces. The artificial faces were of 
high level of human likeness, but evidently differed from the 
real faces considering their perceived aliveness (see [55]).  
II. EXPERIMENT 
A. Participants 
The on-line survey was accessed by 190 people and 
completed by 82. All non-Caucasian and underage individuals, 
as well as those who indicated they only wanted to browse the 
pages of the questionnaire, were excluded before any further 
analyses. The final sample consisted of 58 self-declared 
Caucasian participants (20 men), ranging in age from 18 to 65 
years (M = 25.72, SD = 10.01). Most of them (69%) indicated 
the USA to be their country of origin. The survey was in 
English and the link to it was distributed via universities-based 
web pages and forums.  
B. Materials 
Photographs of eight neutral faces of adult, Caucasian and 
Indian males (four of each) comprised the facial stimuli in this 
experiment. They were acquired from the Center for Vital 
Longevity Face Database [56]. The photographs were used as 
a basis for creating the faces’ artificial-looking counterparts by 
applying a number of modifications in Photoshop (CS3-ME, 
Adobe Systems Inc., 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Examples of real (left) and artificial (right) Caucasian and Indian    
faces. 
 
Facial morphology was not changed in order to preserve 
the faces’ identity. The altered faces (four Caucasian, four 
Indian) composed the set of artificial versions of the stimuli. 
To ensure that artificial faces differed significantly in 
perceived aliveness from real faces, ratings were obtained 
from an independent sample of 60 participants. Results 
confirmed that the artificial versions were judged as being 
significantly less alive (M = 1.52) than the realistic ones (M = 
6.15, p < 0.001, scale 1-7). In total, the stimulus set added up 
to 16 pictures (8 real faces, 8 artificial faces). They measured 
532 x 407 pixels and were displayed on a white background. 
Examples of stimuli are shown in Fig. 1.  
C. Procedure and Design 
Participants took part in the study individually in their own 
time. They were randomly directed to view either real faces or 
their artificial analogues. The experimental task consisted of 
evaluating the degree to which a given characteristic (human 
traits and emotions) could be ascribed to a face. Human traits 
were selected based on dehumanization research by Haslam 
and colleagues [45, 57] and included four uniquely human 
traits (positive: organized, broadminded; negative: rude, 
shallow) and four naturally human traits (positive: friendly, 
trusting; negative: shy, impatient). Emotion terms were drawn 
mainly from research by Demoulin et al. [58] and comprised 
four primary emotions (positive: pleased, calm; negative: 
fearful, angry) and four secondary emotions (positive: 
sympathetic, hopeful; negative: ashamed, guilty). As both 
positive and negative characteristics were used, valence was 
treated as an additional factor in the analyses of results.  
 
Participants were instructed to focus on one face at a time 
and indicate their first impressions. Every page of the survey 
displayed one picture on the top and eight characteristics 
underneath. As each face was to be evaluated on 16 
characteristics overall, all of the faces were presented twice. 
Faces as well as the characteristics appeared in random order 
and responses were marked on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging 
from 1 – not at all, to 7 – very much). The survey was 
delivered using EFS Survey, a web-based software (Version 
9.0, QuestBack AG, Germany). 
III. RESULTS 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with 
Realism of the faces (real, artificial) as a between-subjects 
factor and Ethnicity of the faces (Caucasian, Indian) as well as 
Valence of the traits (positive, negative) as within-subjects 
factors was conducted on four dependent variables (uniquely 
and naturally human traits, primary and secondary emotions). 
For all univariate analyses, the Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment to degrees of freedom was applied. The 
multivariate main effects were significant for Ethnicity, F(4, 
53) = 3.21, p = 0.02, ηp2 = 0.20, and Valence, F(4, 53) = 
11.83, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.47. These two main effects were 
qualified by a significant multivariate interaction between 
Ethnicity and Valence, F(4, 53) = 7.59, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.36.  
In terms of univariate tests, the interaction was significant 
for uniquely human traits, F(1, 0.53) = 6.60, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 
0.12, naturally human traits, F(1, 0.29) = 14.97, p < 0.001, ηp2 
= 0.21, and primary emotions, F(1, 0.43) = 5.03, p = 0.029, ηp2 
= 0.08. Analyses of simple effects showed that participants 
rated Caucasian faces higher on positive naturally human traits 
in comparison to Indian faces (M = 3.62 vs. M = 3.38). Other 
differences concerned exclusively negative characteristics. 
Here, Indian faces scored higher than Caucasian faces on 
negative naturally human traits (M = 3.83 vs. M = 3.52) as 
well as on primary emotions (M = 3.44 vs. M = 3.18). 
Interestingly, Caucasians were rated higher than Indians on 
negative uniquely human traits (M = 3.85 vs. M = 3.36). No 
significant differences occurred for either positive or negative 
secondary emotions (p > 0.05). All mean ratings of Caucasian 
and Indian faces on the characteristics can be seen in Table I.  
TABLE I.  MEAN RATINGS OF CAUCASIAN AND INDIAN FACES ON 
HUMAN TRAITS AND EMOTIONS 
 
Variable 
Caucasian Indian 
M SE M SE 
 
Positive 
    
Uniquely Human Traits 3.45 0.12 3.45 0.13 
Naturally Human Traits 3.62a 0.10 3.38a 0.12 
Primary Emotions 3.85 0.12 3.73 0.13 
Secondary Emotions 3.40 0.11 3.34 0.12 
 
Negative 
    
Uniquely Human Traits 3.85a 0.13 3.36a 0.14 
Naturally Human Traits 3.52a 0.10 3.83a 0.12 
Primary Emotions 3.18a 0.11 3.44a 0.13 
Secondary Emotions 3.22 0.11 3.26 0.12 
Means within rows sharing a common subscript differ at p < 0.05. 
No significant main effect emerged for Realism F(4, 53) = 
0.71, p = 0.587, ηp2 = 0.05, suggesting similar responses to 
real and artificial faces. As can be seen in Fig. 2 ratings were 
highly comparable across the real and artificial versions of the 
faces. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean ratings on positive and negative characteristics for Caucasian 
and Indian faces. There were no significant differences between ratings for 
real and artificial versions of the stimuli. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Out-group members are often perceived as being less 
human than in-group members. They are denied a range of 
specific qualities, including traits classified as naturally 
human, that is, traits linked to interpersonal warmth, openness, 
emotional responsiveness, agency, and depth [45], and 
emotions unique to humans, or secondary emotions [43]. As a 
consequence, they become associated with machines or 
automata. The purpose of the current study was to extend 
earlier research that demonstrated such effects for real faces of 
out-group members by investigating how people would 
respond to artificial faces. In accord with previous findings, 
the results showed that positive naturally human traits were 
attributed to a greater degree to in-group faces in comparison 
to out-group faces. Furthermore, negative naturally human 
traits and negative primary emotions were attributed more to 
the out-group. All of these generalized to the artificial versions 
of the faces. This indicates that artificial facial stimuli elicited 
intergroup processes that are comparable with reactions to real 
faces. The faces represented an ethnic out-group that was 
unfamiliar to the participants and not associated with specific 
stereotypes.  
Greater attribution of positive naturally human traits to the 
in-group manifests the well-established phenomenon of in-
group favoritism and appears to be consistent with predictions 
regarding increased association of the out-group with objects. 
Lack of certain features that are natural or essential to all 
human beings makes out-group members seem cold, rigid, and 
passive, and thus machine-like [45, 57]. Slight out-group 
derogation may be inferred from the way negative naturally 
human traits and negative primary emotions were attributed to 
the faces. Unexpectedly, negative uniquely human traits were 
associated more with the in-group. Greater attribution of 
negative uniquely human traits to the in-group is 
counterintuitive, and contrary to previous findings. However, 
this group of traits, as well as how they are assigned to in-
groups and out-groups, typically has not been related to the 
field of computer technology. As uniquely human features, 
including secondary emotions, principally help distinguish 
humans from animals [45], they might have been extraneous 
in the present framework of human-computer interaction. This 
is also reflected by the finding that no difference occurred in 
how secondary emotions were attributed to in-group and out-
group faces. 
These findings suggest that the perception of how much 
humanness a face conveys may not be determined by its 
realism, but rather by what it represents as a higher-order 
construct; specifically, a construct that carries important social 
meaning. Given the most recent advances in the area of 
computer graphics, the final goal has rested mainly in the 
perfection of synthetic faces’ realism, and thereby generation 
of photorealistic faces that will eventually be impossible to 
distinguish from living humans [5]. In that context, minor 
deficiencies in appearance may render the face unnatural, 
potentially falling into the Uncanny Valley and evoking 
eeriness on the part of the viewers [9, 59]. As a consequence, 
researchers have focused on examining which features of 
faces are problematic by scrutinizing single facial elements at 
a time, for instance the eyes [55, 59, 60], instead of 
considering a face to be a whole that is a salient social 
stimulus, rich in information which the viewer draws on to 
shape the interaction.  
People readily go beyond what they are able to observe 
directly and continually make inferences about the 
unobservable states and characteristics of their interactants. 
One of the critical social functions of faces is that they 
symbolize humanness, embedded in a variety of human 
qualities and in possession of mind that is a prerequisite for 
mental connection, strongly desired by humans [61]. 
Nevertheless, people have been shown not to connect with 
everybody in exactly the same way. Group membership, 
among other factors, plays a crucial role with respect to 
whether and to what extent such connection is attainable. Even 
if out-group members look as realistically as in-group 
members, they may still be regarded as not fully human and 
further, as inadequate candidates for mental synchrony. This 
in turn may have vast implications for the design of computer-
generated characters. Out-group here might refer not only to 
ethnic features, but age, gender, or aspects of clothing that 
might be perceived by the user in a particular way as being 
alike or different. Given the heterogeneity of users, this may 
call for further attempts to customize agents’ human features 
in an attempt to optimize the interaction between user and 
agent. 
In our study, still images of real and artificial humans were 
used. As movement and animation, as well as sound, have 
been found to contribute to the effect of the Uncanny Valley 
[5], an interesting avenue for future research would be to use 
real and artificial faces that are moving and calling for 
contingent interaction, or that otherwise allow the viewer to 
engage in purposeful exchange. It would be worth 
investigating whether the same in-group/ out-group dynamics 
take place. That is, do out-group characters in motion also 
appear less human or elicit more unsettling impressions than 
characters belonging to one’s in-group? Does the fact that the 
viewer has a chance to get accustomed to the characters and 
experience them in a variety of settings make the differences 
in perceived humanness disappear over time? Another 
extension of the current findings could come from the 
inclusion of emotional expressions in addition to neutral faces. 
Considering that displays of emotions or lack of thereof have 
previously been found to add to evaluations of how uncanny 
synthetic faces appear [62], and to what extent threatening 
affect is perceived in out-group members [29, 30], it would be 
interesting to test whether out-group members in real and 
artificial form elicit higher levels of moral disgust and anger 
than in-group members. Finally, the same study could be 
conducted in another culture. For instance, would Indian 
participants attribute greater levels of humanness to Indian 
faces than to Caucasian faces, reversing the results obtained in 
Poland?  
 
The findings of this study suggest that accentuated realism 
of computer-generated faces alone may not be sufficient to 
capture the complexities and subtleties of human perception. 
The design of human-like agents therefore requires 
consideration of purpose-related, social psychological 
processes. 
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